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Abstract 
This paper documents the findings of research into the governance mechanisms 
within the distributed on-line community known as Wikipedia. It focuses in particular 
on the role of normative mechanisms in achieving social self-regulation. A brief 
history of the Wikipedia is provided. This concentrates on the debate about 
governance and also considers characteristics of the wiki technology which can be 
expected to influence governance processes. The empirical findings are then 
presented. These focus on how Wikipedians use linguistic cues to influence one 
another on a sample of discussion pages drawn from both controversial and featured 
articles. Through this analysis a tentative account is provided of the agent-level 
cognitive mechanisms which appear necessary to explain the apparent behavioural 
coordination. The findings are to be used as a foundation for the simulation of 
‘normative’ behaviour. The account identifies some of the challenges that need to be 
addressed in such an attempt including a mismatch between the case findings and 
assumptions used in past attempts to simulate normative behaviour.  
Introduction 
The research documented in this paper is part of the EU funded project titled 
‘Emergence in the Loop: Simulating the two way dynamics of norm innovation’ 
(EMIL) which aims to advance our understanding of emergent social self-
organisation. The project involves conducting several empirical case studies the first 
of which is the Wikipedia.  
When people encounter Wikipedia for the first time and learn how it works, they 
commonly express surprise. The expectation appears to be that an open collaborative 
process of such magnitude should not work.  Yet the Wikipedia has been shown to 
produce credible encyclopaedic articles (Giles, 2005) without the hierarchical and 
credentialist controls typically employed for this type of production.  
The research presented here is framed within the debate about governance 
mechanisms associated with Open Source production systems. This is not the only 
perspective which could be adopted but it does serve to provide some initial 
orientation. Consistent with the wider project focus, the relationship between these 
theories and the theory of social norms is examined.  
In the empirical research we examine the extent to which communicative acts are 
employed by editors to influence the behaviour of others. Particular attention is given 
to the illocutionary force of utterances (Searle, 1969) and the effect of deontic 
 2 
commands linked to general social norms and Wikipedia specific rules. In the 
conclusion some observations are made about the agent-level cognitive mechanisms 
which appear necessary to explain the observed social order as well as the apparent 
influence of social artefacts, goals and the wiki technology.  
The following questions are canvassed through this research. 
 What processes appear to operate in computer mediated organizations which 
enable them to be, in effect, self-regulating? 
 How consistent are the findings with established theories for understanding 
norms and governance, particularly in on-line environments? 
 What alternative hypotheses are there which appear to explain the phenomena 
and which can provide the foundation for future research? 
Governance Theory 
According to the relevant Wikipedia article, the word ‘governance’ derives from the 
Latin that suggests the notion of "steering". The concept of governance is used in a 
number of disciplines and a wide range of contexts and the range and type of steering 
mechanisms differ depending on whether the focus is with states or institutions. While 
both have been applied to Open Source, it is most common (and arguably most 
appropriate) to use institutional concepts of governance.  Institutional steering 
mechanisms may be: formal (designed rules and laws) or informal (emergent as with 
social norms); extrinsic (involving contracts and/or material incentives) or intrinsic 
(involving values and principles); and the mechanisms by which governance operates 
may be top down (imposed by authority) or bottom up (invented by the participants as 
a basis for regulating each other). Theories vary with respect to the mechanisms 
advanced and the emphasis placed on different mechanisms. Theory is also advanced 
for different purposes: to explain or to prescribe. In broad terms the debate is often 
dichotomised with economics derived theories (Agency and Transaction Cost) on one 
side and sociological theories (stewardship) on the other (see J. H. Davis, D. 
Schoorman, & L. Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Depending on the 
position of the advocate these may be presented as antithetical or as viable 
alternatives for different contexts.  
Agency theory derives from neo-classical economics and shares the foundational 
assumption of agent utility maximization. Advocates argue that many productive 
transactions involve principals who delegate tasks to agents to perform on their behalf 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). This gives rise to what is known as the ‘principal’s 
dilemma’. Simply stated this dilemma asks ‘how can the principal ensure that the 
agent will act in its interest rather than on the basis of self-interest?’ Note that this 
dilemma arises from the assumed self-interested nature of agents –it is a dilemma 
intrinsic to the assumptions upon which the theory is based even though this is argued 
to have empirical support. Two general solutions are offered: the use of formal 
contracts and sanctions and the use of material incentives.   
Critics argue that not all human decisions are made on the basis of self-interest. 
Sociological and psychological models of governance posit various alternatives: some 
remain committed to assumptions of rational action and goal seeking, while others 
address issues of power or various forms of intrinsic motivation, including a desire to 
conform to social norms. These latter positions generally form the basis of theories of 
stewardship (J. H. Davis, D. F. Schoorman, & L. Donaldson, 1997).  
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While these two broad sets of ideas form the backdrop to most debates about 
governance in traditional institutions increased recourse has also been made to 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase, 1993, 1995; Williamson, 1996). TCE is 
concerned with the relative merit of alternative governance arrangements for differing 
production environments. Oliver Williamson (1985), a key contributor, states ‘The 
choice of governance mode should be aligned with the characteristics of the 
transaction…’. Principals are presented with a continuum of possible ways of trying 
to achieve effective regulation from open markets to hierarchy. Both of these are seen 
as imposing costs (agency costs for hierarchy and transaction costs for markets). The 
aim is to combine them to achieve an optimum balance between these costs. This 
‘balancing’ implies a top down rational decision making role for institutional 
managers. 
More recently two additional categories of governance have been added to the TCE 
family – ‘networks’ and ‘bazaars’. Both have arisen to explain the emergence of 
production and exchange arrangements which do not seem to fit on the market-
hierarchy continuum. Both Network Governance (Candace Jones, William S Hesterly, 
& Stephen P Borgatti, 1997) and Bazaar Governance (Demil & Lecocq, 2003) are 
argued to be particularly relevant to understanding the flexible structures associated 
with Open Source production.  Demil & Lecocq (2003: 8) cite Jones et al (1997: 916) 
and argue that network governance:   
…involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous forms  
[agents] engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open 
ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate 
and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially – not legally – binding.  
The final sentence highlights the key difference between network and more 
conventional TCE mechanisms. To achieve cooperation the network form of 
governance relies on social control, such as ‘occupational socialization, collective 
sanctions, and reputations’ rather than on formal authority.  
Bazaar governance is also argued to rely heavily on the mechanism of reputation 
(Demil & Lecocq, 2003: 13). Reputation is assumed to provide the incentive to 
become involved and to comply with group expectations and norms. Unlike network 
systems, however, agents are free to enter or leave the exchange process – there are 
no obligations to become or to remain engaged. Raymond (1999) states that ‘contrary 
to network governance, free-riders or opportunistic agents cannot be formally 
excluded from the open-source community’. 
To summarise: 
 Free markets are characterised by: a lack of obligation to engage in a 
transaction; low interdependence between parties involved with the exchange; 
and transactions regulated only by price. Within a pure market the individual 
identities of the transacting parties are not important. 
 In Hierarchies, there are formal contracted obligations on all parties, these are 
maintained by fiat but may also be supported by wider formal institutions e.g. 
Courts. Obligations are associated with formal position making the official 
(role) identity of the parties the key determinant of the relationship.  
 Within network structures, exchanges are regulated using relational contracts – 
there is a formal obligation to remain engaged even though specific actions 
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and operational responsibilities may not be included in a contract. There is 
also some reliance on social norms– the socialised position of actors becomes 
important. Exchange commitments may be relatively short lived and persist 
only so long as they offer mutual benefit. 
 With bazaar governance there is no obligation on any party to perform 
particular duties or even to remain engaged:  there are low entry and exit costs. 
There are few formal mechanisms for policing or sanction but sufficient 
regulation is achieved by means of shared task, reciprocity norms and/or 
informal group sanctioning with participants influenced by their desire to build 
reputation. 
Understanding the role of Norms  
As can be seen, ‘norms’ are argued to play a role in a number of theories of 
governance, with their being particularly significant in Stewardship, Network and the 
Bazaar theories. Sociologists have long argued that norms are fundamental 
mechanisms for social regulation. What though is a ‘norm’? How do norms emerge 
and how are they influenced and by what? 
Gibbs (1981) argues that ‘Sociologists use few technical terms more than norms and 
the notion of norms looms large in their attempt to answer a perennial question: How 
is social order possible?’. Not surprisingly then the concept has been incorporated 
into a wide range of alternative and often competing bodies of theory.  
The normative literature can be divided into two fundamentally distinct groups. In the 
social philosophical tradition (Lewis, 1969) norms are seen as a particular class of 
emergent social behaviour which spontaneously arise in a population. From this 
perspective, a ‘norm’ is a pattern identified by an observer ex-post. The defining 
characteristic of the pattern is the apparently prescriptive/proscriptive character: 
people behave ‘as if’ they were following a rule.  By contrast, the view offered by the 
philosophy of law sees norms as a source of social order. This standpoint assumes the 
prior existence of (powerful) social institutions and posits them as the source of rules, 
which, when followed, lead to social patterns. These positions appear antithetical 
although following the work of Berger and Luckman (1972) each may be seen as a 
part of a dialectic whereby emergent social patterns become reintegrated and 
formalised in institutions.  
Therborn argues (2002: 868) that people follow norms for different reasons. The 
extremes run from habit or routine to rational knowledge of consequences for self or 
the world. Between these lie: 
 Identification with the norm or values – linking sense of self (identity) to the 
norm source (person, organization or doctrine) often leading to in-group-out-
group.  
 Deep internalization – self-respect – done independently to what others are 
doing. 
Bicchieri  (2006: 59) provides a rare hint at the cognitive process involved stating: 
To ‘activate’ a norm means that the subjects involved recognise that the norm 
applies: They infer from some situational cues what the appropriate behaviour 
is, what they should expect others to do and what they are expected to do 
themselves, and act upon those cues.  
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This suggests a complex process of self-classification (how am ‘I’ situated with 
respect to this group and what is the nature of the situation in which ‘I’ find myself, 
does a norm pertain to ‘me’ in this situation and under what conditions and to what 
extent am I obliged to comply?).  
To begin to identify which (if any) of these loosely defined mechanisms might be 
supported by evidence and to aid in the development of a theory of norms helpful for 
understanding the more general mechanisms at play in social self-regulation we 
selected the Wikipedia as a preliminary case study. Wikipedia belongs to the Open 
Source movement as it has adopted the Open Source License. It was originally 
designed to operate under the umbrella of a conventional hierarchical form of 
governance and its unanticipated success as a radical governance experiment makes it 
a particularly interesting case study. It was anticipated that findings in relation to the 
Wikipedia may have some wider relevance to understanding the open source 
phenomena but also serve to cast light on mechanisms which underpin human 
institutions– particularly those that are more normative in nature. In order to be able 
to judge the degree of generalisation that may be possible it is first important to 
identify the distinctive features of the Wikipedia.  
The Wikipedia 
Wikipedia grew out of an earlier Web encyclopaedia project called Nupedia founded 
by Jimmy Wales with Larry Sanger appointed as its first editor-in-chief. From its 
inception Nupedia was linked to a free information concept and thus the wider open 
source movement.  Nupedia used traditional hierarchical methods from compiling 
content with contributors expected to be experts. The resulting complex and time 
consuming process and an associated lack of openness have been argued to explain 
the failure of the Nupedia. Sanger (2006; 2007), however, questions this view, 
arguing that the expert model was sound but needed to be simplified.  
Sanger was introduced to the WikiWiki software platform in 2001 and saw in it a way 
to address the limitations hampering Nupedia. The inherent openness of the Wikiwiki 
environment was, however, seen as a problem so Wikipedia began as an experimental 
side project. Sanger notes that a majority of the Nupedia Advisory Board did not 
support the Wikipedia, being of the view ‘…that a wiki could not resemble an 
encyclopaedia at all, that it would be too informal and unstructured’ (Sanger, 2007).  
However the intrinsic openness of Wikipedia attracted increasing numbers of 
contributors and quickly developed a life of its own. Almeida et al (2007) note that 
growth in articles, editors and users have all shown an exponential trajectory. From 
Sanger’s earlier comments it is clear that he had been surprised at the rate of 
development and of the quality achieved by the relatively un-coordinated action of 
many editors.  
The Debate over Governance in Wikipedia 
The use and enforcement of principles and rules has been an ongoing issue within the 
Wikipedia community with a division emerging between the founders and within the 
wider community about whether rules were necessary and if they were, how extensive 
they should be and how they should be policed. The power to police rules or impose 
sanctions has always been limited by the openness of the technology platform. 
Initially Sanger and Wales, were the only administrators with the power to exclude 
participants from the site. In 2004 this authority was passed to an Arbitration 
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Committee which could delegate administrator status more widely.  The Arbitration 
Committee is a mechanism of last resort in the dispute resolution process, only 
dealing with the most serious disputes. Recommendations for appointment to this 
committee are made by open elections with appointment the prerogative of Wales.  
In the early stages Sanger argues the need was for participants more than rules and so 
the only rule was ‘there is no rule’. The reason for this, he explains, was that they 
needed to gain experience of how wikis worked before over prescribing the 
mechanisms. However, ‘As the project grew and the requirements of its success 
became increasingly obvious, I became ambivalent about this particular "rule" and 
then rejected it altogether’ (Sanger, 2007). However, in the minds of some members 
of the community, it had become ‘the essence’ of Wikipedia.’  
In the beginning, complete openness was seen as valuable to encourage all comers 
and to avoid them feeling intimidated. Radical collaboration – allowing everybody to 
edit everyone’s (unsigned) articles – also avoided ownership and attendant 
defensiveness. Importantly it also removed bottle necks associated with ‘expert’ 
editing. That said the handpicking of a few core people is regarded by Sanger as 
having had an important and positive impact on the early development of Wikipedia. 
Sanger argues for example ‘I think it was essential that we began the project with a 
core group of intelligent good writers who understood what an encyclopaedia should 
look like, and who were basically decent human beings’ (2005). In addition to 
‘seeding’ the culture with a positive disposition, this statement highlights the potential 
importance of establishing a style consistent with the Encyclopaedia genre – a stylistic 
model which might shape the subsequent contributions of others.  
Sanger argues that in the early stages ‘force of personality’ and ‘shaming’ were the 
only means used to control contributors and that no formal exclusion occurred for six 
months, despite there being difficult characters from the beginning. The aim was to 
live with this ‘good natured anarchy’ until the community itself could identify and 
posit a suitable rule-set. Within Wikipedia rules evolved and as new ones were needed 
they were added to the ‘What Wikipedia is not’ page’.  Wales then added the ‘Neutral 
Point of View’ (NPOV) page which emphasised the need for contributions to be free 
of bias. The combination of clear purpose and the principle of neutrality provided a 
reference point against which all contributions could be easily judged. Sanger regards 
the many rules, principles and guidelines which have evolved since as secondary and 
not essential for success.  
How do newcomers learn these (ever increasing) rules and do they actually influence 
behaviour? Bryant et al (2005) suggest that there is evidence of ‘legitimate peripheral 
practice’, a process whereby newcomers learn the relevant rules, norms and skills by 
serving a kind of apprenticeship. These authors argue that this is evident in new 
editors of Wikipedia initially undertaking minor editing tasks before moving to more 
significant contributions, and possibly, eventually, taking administrative roles. These 
authors tend to project a rather idealistic view of involvement, however, overlooking a 
key attribute of the wiki environment –newcomers have the same rights as long 
standing participants and experts and this mechanism for socialising newcomers can 
be effectively bypassed.  
In some Open Source environments (such as Open Source Software) it is possible to 
gain reputation which may be usable in the wider world. The commitment to the 
community is often explained (for an excellent overview see Rossi, April, 2004) by 
arguing that a desire for reputation increases compliance. However, in the Wikipedia 
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environment there is no list of contributors to which an editor can point as evidence of 
their contribution (although they can self-identify their contributions on their user 
page). Contributions are, in essence, non attributable. In the case of Wikipedia 
identification with product, community and values appears a more likely reason for 
remaining involved than does reputation.  
In a study specifically designed to study the conflict and coordination costs of 
Wikipedia, Kittur, Suh, Pendleton, & Chi (2007: 453) note that there has a been a 
significant increase in regulatory costs over time. ‘…direct work on articles is 
decreasing, while indirect work such as discussions, procedure, user coordination, 
and maintenance activity (such as reverts and anti-vandalism) is increasing’. The 
proportion of indirect edits (i.e. those on discussion or support pages) has increased 
from 2% to 12%. Kittur et al cite an interview respondent as stating ‘the degree of 
success that one meets in dealing with conflicts (especially conflicts with experienced 
editors) often depends on the efficiency with which one can quote policy and 
precedent.’ (Kittur et al., 2007: 454). This suggests that force of argument supported 
by the existence of the formal rules and etiquette are important to the governance 
process. This is however based on ex post attributions.  
Wiki technology- the artefact 
Wiki technology has a very flat learning curve: contributing is extremely simple. 
There are few technical impediments confronting novice users. Wiki platforms are 
intrinsically open supporting decentralised action unless modified to control or 
restrict access. Division of labour emerges as editors choose which pages interest 
them and which they want to focus on contributing to or maintaining.   
Wikipedia has added a number of facilities which support the ready detection and 
correction of vandalism.  Watch lists support users in taking responsibility for the 
oversight and monitoring of particular topics. Changes made to a page are logged 
using a history list which supports comparison between versions as well as 
identifying the time and date of any change and the ID of who made that change.  The 
reversion facility supports the rapid reinstatement of the page content. Lih (2004: 4) 
attributes significance to this feature noting that ‘This crucial asymmetry tips the 
balance in favour of productive and cooperative members of the wiki community, 
allowing quality content to emerge’. and Stvilia et all (2004: 13) note that ‘By 
allowing the disputing sides to obliterate each others contributions easily, a wiki 
makes the sides interdependent in achieving their goals and perhaps surprisingly may 
encourage more consensus building rather than confrontation’. 
Stvilia, Twidale, Gasser, & Smith (2005) among others identify discussion pages as 
an important  ‘…coordination artefact which helps to negotiate and align members 
perspectives on the content and quality of the article.’  Discussion pages provide an 
opportunity for managing minor disputes about content or editing behaviour and for 
movement towards the agreement.  
Ciffiolilli (2007) has argued that a significant consequence of these technical features 
is the way in which they alter transaction costs (Coase, 1993; Williamson & Winter, 
1993). Transaction costs result from information overheads associated with complex 
coordination. However, the technology does not cancel other costs of coordination 
and control. These are commonly referred to as agency costs and the highly open 
nature of the wiki may increase them. In hierarchies, this cost is evident in the cost of 
command and control (management overhead) whereas in the Open Source 
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environment they are borne by the participating community (and not necessarily 
equitably). The cost burden will be less where there is a high level of self-regulation 
and lower where a lack of goal alignment or low social commitment leads 
contributors to disregard others and act individualistically or opportunistically. The 
efficacy of cultural control will be influenced by factors such as the homogeneity of 
the user group and that group’s propensity for self-organisation (endogenous norm 
formation), rates of turnover of the group, and the effect of external perturbation of 
the group or of the task on which they are working. This may also be subject to 
feedback effects: reduced norm compliance may lead to higher turnover and reduced 
commitment, further reducing norm compliance for example. 
In conclusion then, Wikipedia is a volunteer open source project characterised by low 
ties between contributors, no formal obligations and very few means for the exercise 
of formal sanction. There is a low level of reciprocity with contributors under no 
obligation to maintain engagement. The wiki technology is open, inviting many to the 
task and imposing low costs to participation while reducing transaction costs. There is 
however high reliance on pro-social behaviour dominating if agency costs (borne by 
individuals) is not to lead to high turnover and possible governance failure. The 
anonymity of Wikipedia precludes any significant reputation effects outside of the 
small group of co-editors who maintain extended involvement with an article and to a 
very limited degree the wider Wikipedia community.  
Wikipedians have produced a set of permissions, obligations, rules and norms which 
have been documented in guidelines and etiquettes as well as embedded in technical 
artefacts such as style bots. The need for and effect of these is however controversial. 
From a governance perspective there are relatively few means within Wikipedia by 
which formal control can be exercised using these rules and the community relies 
instead on the use of informal or ‘soft’ control. These mechanisms need to be 
effective in the face of perturbation from ‘vandals’ (task saboteurs), ‘trolls’ (social 
saboteurs), as well as turnover of contributors in the context of a task which can 
require the accommodation of emotionally charged and value based issues. 
Analysis of Governance Micro-mechanisms. 
In Wikipedia there are two classes of activity: editing; and conversation about editing. 
This paper is not concerned with the editing activity (although this is to be considered 
in future research) but with the self-organising and self-regulating phenomena which 
make it possible. Insight into this can be gained by examining the Discussion pages 
which accompany many of the articles rather than the articles themselves. The activity 
on the Discussion pages comprises a series of ‘utterances’ or speech acts between 
contributors about editing activity and the quality of product. On the face of it then, 
these pages should provide a fertile source of data to support analysis of how 
governance operates in the Wikipedia, in particular informal or ‘soft’ governance.  
Within these pages we expected to see attempts by editors to influence the behaviour 
of one another through the only means available to them – communicative acts. We 
anticipated that these may exhibit some regularity which would allow us to examine 
both the range and type of events that led to the explicit invocation of rules and norms 
and which revealed emergent influence patterns which were themselves normative. 
We wanted also to examine what conventions prevailed and how these compared and 
interacted with the goal of the community and its policies. A convention is defined 
here as a behavioural regularity widely observed by members of the community. 
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Policies include explicit codes of conduct as well as guidelines (etiquettes) and 
principles.  
Methodology 
For the study we randomly selected a sample of Discussion pages associated with 
both Controversial and Featured articles. At the time of the study (May/June 2007) 
there were 583 articles identified by the Wikipedia community as controversial. The 
featured articles are more numerous. At the time of the study there were 
approximately 1900 of them. The analysis reported here is based on a sample of 
nineteen Controversial and eleven Featured articles. The most recent three pages of 
discussion were selected for analysis from each Discussion page associated with the 
article included in the sample.  
These were subjected to detailed coding using the Open Source qualitative analysis 
software WeftQDA. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis was performed. The 
latter was undertaken by re-processing the coded utterances such that each utterance 
constituted a case and each applied code a variable associated with that case. This 
data set was then analysed using SPSS.  
A number of coding schemes for natural speech were considered before choosing to 
use the Verbal Response Mode (VRM) taxonomy (Stiles, 1992). VRM has been 
developed over many years and used in a wide range of communication contexts. 
Stiles defines it as ‘a conceptually based, general purpose system for coding speech 
acts. The taxonomic categories are mutually exclusive and they are exhaustive in the 
sense that every conceivable utterance can be classified.’ (Stiles, 1992: 15). The 
classification schema is attractive where there is a need (as here) to capture many of 
the subtleties of natural language use that derive from and rely on the intrinsic 
flexibility and ambiguity of natural language yet map them to a more formal system 
needed for computer simulation.  
Additional codes were applied to identify: valence, subject of communication, explicit 
invocation or norms or rules and the associated deontic and trigger, whether the 
receiver/s accepted the illocutionary force of the utterance and the ID and registration 
status of the person making the utterance.  
There were 3654 utterances coded in these thirty three documents.  
Findings 
Style of Communication 
There was a statistically significant correlation between the article group 
(Controversial vs Featured) and broad style of communication. This was however 
very small at -0.078 (p=.01 2-tailed). This difference was most apparent when 
examined at the level of specific styles. Both groups had approximately similar 
proportions of neutrally phrased utterances (approximately 64%). Nearly one quarter 
(22.5%) of all utterances in Featured articles were positive compared to only eleven 
percent in controversial sites. By comparison nearly one quarter (23.9%) of all 
utterances in controversial sites were negative compared to fourteen percent for 
featured. The positive styles of ‘affirming’, ‘encouraging’ and ‘acknowledging’ were 
significantly overrepresented in the featured articles but underrepresented in the 
controversial articles. The reverse was the case for the negative styles of ‘aggressive’, 
‘contemptuous’ and ‘dismissive’.  
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There was a statistically significant correlation between the broad style of 
communication and the editor status. The correlation was again very low at -.054 
(p=.01 two tailed). 
Overall, the most common positive utterance was affirming (4.7%) closely followed 
by encouraging (4.7%) and acknowledging (4.3%). The most common negative 
utterance was dismissive (8.2%) followed by defensive (6.4%) and contemptuous 
(3.5%). 
All the Wikipedia discussions sampled reflected a strongly neutral-objective style 
(although from the qualitative observations it was apparent that the content was 
sometimes far from objective or balanced). The statistically significant difference 
between Controversial and Featured sites was in the relative balance of positive and 
negative utterance and was not so great as to explain the different status awarded the 
associated articles.  
Validation 
Within speech act theory (Habermas, 1976; Searle, 1969), validation refers to whether 
an utterance made by one speaker is accepted, rejected, ignored or let go unquestioned 
by the intended recipient/s.  
In the Wikipedia sample half of all utterances were accepted without question. A 
further eighteen percent were explicitly accepted by at least one editor; eleven percent 
were explicitly rejected and a substantial twenty two percent were ignored. Twenty 
five percent of positive style utterances were accepted by at least one editor compared 
to eighteen percent of neutral and only nine percent of negative. By comparison only 
two percent of positive utterances were rejected compared to nine percent of neutral 
and twenty six percent of negative. Positive utterances were more likely to be 
accepted without question (61%) compared to negative (21.7%) and neutral (54.4%). 
Negative comments were more likely to be ignored (44.1%) compared to neutral 
(18.2%) and positive (11.4%).  
From this we can conclude that positive utterances are more likely to be validated 
than negative, but that overall, a significant number of utterances are ignored or 
rejected.  
Normative and rule invocation 
Overall 5.2% of all utterances involved norm or rule invocation. This meant that 
Wikipedia rules were invoked 122 times and general social norms a further 77 times 
in 3654 utterances. This overall number was contributed to disproportionately by 
three (outlier) articles in the sample. Rules were most commonly invoked in response 
to neutral style communication (63.9%) followed by twenty seven percent in response 
to a negative style. Only nine percent of positive style utterances were responded to 
with a rule invocation. By comparison, norms were most commonly invoked in 
response to negative style utterances (53.2%) followed by neutral (44.2%) and then 
positive (2.6%). The difference in likelihood of invocation by style was statistically 
significant (p=.001).  
A Wikipedia rule invocation was most likely to be triggered by the form of an article 
(44.9%) an edit action (22%); an article fact or a person’s behaviour (both 16%). A 
norm was most likely to be triggered by a person’s behaviour (35.6%), an edit action 
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(23.3%), article form (21.9%), or article fact (19.2%). This pattern did not differ to a 
significant degree between the Featured and Controversial sites.  
Nearly three quarters (73.6%) of rule invocations had the implicit deontic of ‘it is 
obligatory’ Norms also were most likely to carry this deontic (61.3%). The second 
most likely deontic was ‘it is permissible that’ (9.7%).  
While there was no statistically significant difference in the degree to which either 
norms or rules were invoked between the Featured and Controversial articles, there 
was a qualitative difference in the role norm and rule invocation played. In 
Controversial discussions, social norms and rules were most likely to be invoked 
against the behaviour of an editor who was of a different view (group?) while in 
Featured sites, norms and rules were somewhat more often used by the editor as a 
reflection on their own contribution – i.e. involved a level of self-check. This might 
take the form of a statement such as ‘I know this is not NPOV but…..’. 
Registered vs non-registered users 
There was no statistically significant difference in the likelihood for either registered 
or non-registered users to invoke norms or rules. There was a statistically significant 
difference between registered and non-registered editors (p=.000) when it came to 
validation. Registered editors were more likely than non-registered to be explicitly 
accepted (18.7% of utterances compared to 13.9%), less likely to be rejected (9.9% 
compared to 13.7%), considerably less likely to be ignored (18.3% compared to 
34.7%) or unquestioned (53.1% compared to 37.6%). Qualitatively, however, it was 
much more common that un-registered users would make suggestions before 
undertaking edits, particularly in the Features articles, so their behaviour was less 
likely to attract action or comment.  
Non-registered editors were more likely to make negative style utterances (24.3% 
compared to 18.5%) and less likely to make positive utterances (9.5% compared to 
17.4%). This difference was significant (p=.000). 
Influence through Illocutionary Force 
The theory of speech acts distinguishes between the meaning of an utterance and its 
pragmatic intent. With the VRM coding frame used in this research each utterance is 
coded twice, once to capture the semantic form and again to capture the use of 
language to exert (illocutionary) force (Searle, 1969). A typical utterance may have a 
form which differs from the intent. The utterance ‘could you close the door?’, for 
example, has the form of a question but the intent of advisement:  the speaker intends 
the listener to close the door.  In VRM, the relationship of form to intent is expressed, 
using the statement "in service of" (Stiles, 1992). In this example the question ‘could 
you close the door’ is ‘in service of’ the advisement ‘close the door’. In standard 
presentation this is recorded as (QA). 
Edification in service of Edification (EE) is the most frequent form of utterance in the 
Wikipedia sample – 37% of all utterances were of this mode. The Edification mode is 
defined as deriving from the speaker’s frame of reference, making no presumption 
about the listener and using a neutral (objective) frame of reference shared by both 
speaker and listener. This mode is informative, unassuming and acquiescent. As a 
strategy for influencing others it reflects attempts to convince by neutral objective 
argument.  
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The second most common mode is that of Disclosure in service of Disclosure (DD). 
Disclosure is defined as being from the speaker’s experience, making no presumption, 
but being framed using the speaker’s frame of reference. This is summarised as 
informative, unassuming but directive. Unlike EE mode, DD mode represents an 
attempt by the speaker to impose or have the listener accept the speaker’s frame. 
Twelve percent of all utterances adopted this form.  
The third most common mode is Disclosure in service of Edification (DE). The DE 
mode represents an utterance which is from the speaker’s frame of reference but as if 
it is neutral or from a shared frame. Eight percent of all utterances used this mode. 
This is a somewhat neutral mode where the speaker offers clearly labelled personal 
knowledge as information.  
The fourth most common mode is Advisement in service of Advisement (AA). AA 
mode represents speech from the speaker’s experience, which makes presumptions 
about the listener and adopts the speaker’s frame of reference. It can be summarised 
as informative, presumptuous and directive. It commonly takes the form of ‘you 
should….’ Approximately 7% of utterances were in this mode. A further 12% of 
utterances have the directive pragmatic intent of advisement masked by using a less 
presumptuous form – that of Edification or Disclosure.  
Significantly, utterances associated with politeness (such as acknowledgements 5%) 
and with discourse which aims at mutual understanding, such as confirmation (1.5%) 
and reflection (1%), were very rare in the Wikipedia sample. 
Discussion of Findings 
What is significant about the utterance strategies is that they typically involve an 
exchange of assertions delivered with a neutral – i.e. non-emotive style. There are 
very few explicit praises, or put downs, and few niceties like explicit 
acknowledgements of one another. Seldom do contributors refer to one another by 
name – the exchanges are rather impersonal. This does not tally with what one would 
expect if the Wikipedia etiquette (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Etiquette) 
had been institutionalised. The Featured articles conform a little more closely with 
what one would expect than do the Controversial, but if we assume that the etiquette 
captures the community’s ideal, the emerged patterns do not conform to that ‘ideal’ to 
the extent that might be expected in either case.  Similarly we see low levels of 
questioning or of reflection (i.e. feeding back the words of the speaker to check 
understanding or to come to better understand the other’s intentions). This is arguably 
inconsistent with the task needs – to reach consensus on controversial topics. The 
frequency with which utterances were ignored also suggested low engagement by 
participants in the discussion. All of this would seem to need some explanation. 
The absence of any expression of acknowledgement of emotions and/or similarity of 
attitude (homophilly) among many contributors suggests that Wikipedia lacks many 
of the qualities of verbal exchange that would identify it as strong community. It is 
more consistent with being a place to share coordination of a task. This could suggest 
that the goal is the primary orientating point. However, the lack of quality of 
discourse needed to achieve consensus is more indicative of a brief encounter between 
different and established milieux which struggle to find common understanding rather 
than of a community committed to a common goal (Becker & Mark, 1997). This 
might suggest that the shared goal may be subordinate to more personal goals by a 
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considerable proportion of contributors. Or it may be that the technology and 
environment will support no more than this.  
The Wikipedia environment supports saboteurs who can use the opportunity afforded 
by the open and anonymous platform to use identity deception i.e. to mimic the 
language and style of an ‘expert’ or to present as a genuine editor while trying to 
pursue a personal or political agenda hostile to the aims or interests of the Wikipedia. 
We found no direct evidence of this behaviour in the pages we sampled even though 
the discussions about controversial articles provide particularly fertile ground for such 
sabotage.  Nevertheless the threat of it could have an overall influence on the type of 
communication conventions which arise. Editors may, for example, display reserve 
and suspicion, withholding trust and taking conventional signals of authority and 
identity (Donath, 1998) as unreliable. The first principle in the Wikipedia etiquette is 
‘assume good faith’.  To do so would, however, leave the process more vulnerable to 
‘troll’ activity. 
Utterance strategies between registered and unregistered editors did not vary greatly, 
although unregistered editors were more likely to use disclosure intent and more 
likely to ask questions (possibly associated with the increased likelihood that they are 
relatively new to Wikipedia). They are also more likely to be negative – reflecting 
their potentially lower commitment to the article or the community.  
Qualitatively there was considerable evidence of mind reading (theory of mind) – i.e. 
editors appeared to form judgements about the intent of others on relatively little 
information.  There was, however, little evidence of the use of utterance strategies to 
better understand or check these theories of mind. Some editors, particularly in the 
Controversial discussions appeared quick to judge and then follow response patterns 
consistent with those judgements (e.g. ignoring or accepting utterances of others). 
There were also few instances of renegotiated patterns of communication style. 
Positions and styles stayed relatively constant over the period of the interaction. Only 
occasionally would an editor modify his/her style significantly if challenged. Of the 
rule invocations 26% were accepted, a similar proportion were rejected or ignored and 
the remainder went unquestioned (but generally had no affect on behaviour). This is 
consistent with norms being triggered by a limited range of cues which allow 
individuals to locate themselves and select identities appropriate to a context and 
which then remain essentially stable. The invocation of rules and norms appears to 
have little to no immediate effect on behaviour although it is not clear if it has an 
effect in subsequent behaviour as this cannot be ascertained from the available data. 
Conclusions and future work 
In this study we set out to identify mechanisms which underpin the emergence of 
systemic self-organisation in a volunteer on-line global institution. The aim was to 
specify the mechanisms involved in order to support the design of a simulation 
architecture suitable for the wider study of normative mechanisms. The findings have 
challenged some of our assumptions and expectations, in particular: 
 The more detailed and specific behavioural etiquette seems to have little 
influence on the overall character and style of interaction. 
 The overall quality of interaction of editors falls short of the range and quality 
of communicative style characteristic of a community and that would be 
consistent with what one would expect, given the nature of the task.  
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 Most regulation is achieved without the need for frequent explicit invocation 
of rules or norms. Rather, behaviour seems to accord to a convention which 
editors quickly recognise and conform to (or bring to the Wikipedia) and 
which minimally accommodates what needs to be done to satisfy the task in a 
context of potentially heterogeneous personal goals.  
 There was a lack of evidence of active negotiation of expectations and 
standards and convergence of behaviour towards a norm. Within the 
discussion pages there appeared to be little obvious norm innovation, 
evolution, adaptation or extension. This suggests that on first encounter with 
Wikipedia, editors read a set of cues as to what constitutes appropriate or 
acceptable behaviour and then accommodate it. Alternatively the order 
observed may be largely attributable to the prior socialisation of participants 
with local norms and rules playing a very minor part in supporting task 
regulation. 
 While there is a difference between controversial and featured sites this is 
minimal and the quality of the interaction cannot explain the difference in 
status. Similarly there appeared to be little in the subject matter of the two 
groups of articles which would explain the difference – both contained subject 
matter which was contestable and subject to significantly diverse opinion.  
Wikipedia is not a market as there is no tradable product or price, either in a 
conventional sense or in the form of tradable reputation. Nor is Wikipedia a command 
hierarchy:  the openness of the wiki platform and the low cost of joining and leaving 
precludes formal control as a primary means for governance. Neither is Wikipedia 
well described by the network theory of governance as there is no obligation to 
maintain involvement. While it might be expected that the Bazaar Governance would 
apply, the absence of a reputation mechanism suggests that it may be better 
considered through the more general lens of stewardship theory. Even here, there is 
no role for moral leadership but rather a diffused willingness to comply with certain 
minimum standards on the part of a sufficient majority.  
There is no clear basis to argue that the apparent order is a direct result of the use of 
deontic commands associated with social norms and environment specific rules. 
Despite the fact that the community has been a prolific rule generator, they appear to 
play a minor role.  Contributors demonstrate a style which is broadly inconsistent with 
these rules and not a good fit with the task.  
Overall though there is order and it appears to be emergent. The mechanisms which 
underpin this emergence have not been revealed by the analysis undertaken to date 
although some hypotheses can be tentatively suggested. The neutral-objective style 
may be a consequence of the anonymity and open nature of the environment – leading 
to a suspension of trust. It may propagate as new comers copy the pattern through a 
process of behavioural cueing. It is possible also that the order is due to pro-social 
behaviour internalized and brought to the task. The volunteer nature of Wikipedia, 
and the level of commitment required, is likely to mean that long term editors reflect a 
pro-social disposition (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). In this context 
a little norm/rule invocation may go a long way if not by influencing immediate 
behaviour then by encouraging future compliance and/or by giving incentive for non-
compliers to leave. The relatively small difference in overall style apparent in relation 
to the diverse range of articles may have little to do with the specific communicative 
behaviours adopted in communication about that article but rather due to the chance 
 15 
association of individuals at a given point of time and how this subtle process of 
encouragement and dissuasion plays out over time. Such a view is quite different from 
that modelled in past attempts to simulate social norms.  
A review of past approaches to the simulation of norms undertaken by EMIL partners 
at the University of Bayreuth concluded that the past research drew on the traditions 
of game theory and artificial intelligence. The latter were exclusively in the first 
generation AI tradition. Significantly, data drawn from real social situations was 
seldom used and there was a strong tendency to build on prior work with little 
questioning of assumptions about the nature of normative behaviour. Seldom was any 
mainstream theory of social behaviour employed as a part of the research program. 
The EMIL project is notable, therefore, for its insistence on the need to adopt an 
empirical orientation: for models to be designed in the light of and tested against 
observations drawn from real world cases of normative behaviour as well as in its 
avoidance of pre-commitment to particular simulation models or traditions.  
While the findings of the research to date are far from conclusive they do challenge 
many of the assumptions incorporated into past simulations and suggest a range of 
alternative hypotheses. Some of these will be able to be critically examined by further 
analysis of the current data and/or by data currently being collected through a 
controlled wiki experiment as well as data proposed to be collected in a case study in 
Second Life. The EMIL simulator is being designed to support a range of alternative 
assumptions and so should allow us to test alternative hypotheses and contribute to 
our understanding of this increasingly significant phenomena. 
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